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TIIE END OF THINKING 
by Giorgio Agamben 
It happens much as when, walking through the woods, we are sud-
denly struck by the unheard variety of animal voices: trills, whistles, 
and gurglings; knells as of wood or metal splinters; chirps, whirrs, 
and whispers: springing immediately from him, each animal his own 
proper voice. In the end, the cuckoo's double note mocks our silence 
and reveals the untenability of our being, unique, voiceless amidst the 
boundless chorus of animal voices. Only then do we attempt to speak, 
to think. 
In our tongue, the word thinking bears originally the meaning of 
anguish, of burning anxiety, as can still be found in the familiar 
expression "stare in pensiero," to be thoughtful, to worry. The Latin 
verb pendere, from which the word is derived in the Romance lan-
guages, means "to be suspended." St. Augustine employs it in this 
sense in order to characterize the learning process: "The desire 
inherent in research ushers from the seeker and, somehow suspended 
[pendet quodammodo1 doesn't rest in the end it seeks but when the 
seeker and what is sought find each other in unity." 
What is it that is suspended, what "hangs" in thinking? We can think, 
in language, solely because language is and is not our voice. There's a 
pending, an unresolved question in language, and that is, whether 
language is or is not our voice, the way braying is properly the voice of 
a donkey and chirping that of a cricket. That is why, when we speak, 
we can't do without thinking, without keeping the words suspended. 
Thinking is the pending of the voice in language. 
(Obviously the cricket cannot think while chirping) 
When in the evening we walk through the woods, at every step we 
hear the rustling of invisible animals amidst the bushes that line the 
path, knowing not whether they are lizards or porcupines, thrushes or 
snakes. The same happens when we think: what counts is not the path 
of the words we are traveling, but the indistinct toddling we hear 
occasionally moving by the edges, a fleeing animal or something 
suddenly aroused by the noise of our footsteps. 
The fleeing animal, we've been told, the fleeing rustle we feel through 
the words, is our voice. We think - we hold the words suspended and 
ourselves hanging in language - we think because ultimately we 
hope to find the voice there, in language. Once, we've been told, the 
voice wrote itself into language. The quest of the voice in language is 
called thinking. 
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That language surprise and ever anticipate the voice; that the pend-
ing of the voice in language have no end: this is the problem in 
philosophy. (How each one resolves this slant is called ethics.) 
But the voice, the human voice is not: there is no such thing called our 
voice that we can follow in the traces of language, enabling us to 
gather-so as to remember it-the moment it vanishes into names, the 
moment it inscribes itself in letters. We speak with the voice we don't 
have, the voice that was never written (Antigone, 454). And language 
is always like "dead letter." 
Thinking: we can think only if language is not our voice, only if we 
fathom the bottom of our voicelessness. But in truth, there's no bottom. 
Such an abyss is what we call the world. 
Logic shows that language is not my voice. It says moreover that the 
voice, though it has been, is no longer, nor can it ever be. Language 
takes place in the non-place of the voice. Which means that, concern-
ing the voice, thinking has nothing to say. This we may call its piety. 
So then the fleeing, the pending of the voice in language must come to 
an end. We can finally stop holding language, and the voice, in a 
suspended state. If the voice has never been, if thinking is the thinking 
of the voice, then it has nothing to think about. A thought which is 
fulfilled, in other words, has no thoughts left to think. 
Of the Latin verb that, for centuries, indicated thinking, cogitare, 
scarcely a trace remains in our language, in the word tracotanza, 
haughtiness, arrogance. In the XIV Century, coto, cuitanza meant: 
THINKING. Tracotanza stems, by way of the Provem;al oltracuidansa, 
from the Latin *ultracogitare: to exceed, to go beyond the limit of 
thinking, overthinking, dis-thinking. 
What has been said can once again be said. But what has been thought 
cannot ever be said again. One takes leave of a thought word for ever. 
We walk through the woods; suddenly, we hear a whirring of wings or 
displaced grass. A hen-pheasant flies up and we can barely see it 
disappear amidst the boughs, a porcupine delves deeper into the thick 
of the brush, parched leaves creak and crumble under the sliding 
serpent. Thinking is not the encounter with, but the flight from invisi-
ble animals. No, it wasn't our voice: we drew as near to language as 
possible, we almost skimmed it, held it suspended: but our meeting 
did not take place, and we must now turn away, thoughtless, toward 
home. 
Then does language become our voice, our language. The way you are 
speaking now, this is what we call ethics. 
[English version by Peter Carravetta] 
